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Settlement Escrows
Robert H. Gertner**  and Geoffrey P. Miller***
This paper proposes and analyzes settlement escrows as a method
to reduce delay in pretrial bargaining. A settlement escrow is an ar-
rangement whereby an agent stands ready to receive cash settlement
offers from the parties to a lawsuit. If the escrow agent receives of-
fers which cross—if the defendant offers more to settle than the
plaintiff demands—the court imposes a settlement at the midpoint
of the offers. Absent settlement, the agent maintains absolute se-
crecy about the size of the offers received, or even the fact that an
offer has been made.
We argue that such escrows are potentially beneficial because
they permit parties to make reasonable settlement offers, the secrecy
of which makes the timing and size of the offer communicate less
private information. This reduces, but does not eliminate, the ad-
verse inferences about the strength of the offeror’s case that the of-
feree can draw from a reasonable offer. The settlement-inducing
qualities of the escrow are explored in a game-theoretic model where
more cases are settled (and are settled earlier) with an escrow in place
than would be settled in its absence. Expected outcomes are typically
closer to true expected damages than in the absence of a settlement
escrow. In addition, we discuss how escrows may reduce delay and
impasse if failure to settle is due to factors other than private infor-
mation, such as psychological reasons, other strategic effects, or
lawyer/client agency problems.
An appealing feature of settlement escrows is that they are sim-
ple to implement. The clerk of the court where the litigation is
pending could easily act as the escrow agent, although a private party
could do so as well upon agreement by the parties. The costs of the
escrow services would be minimal. And because it would be entirely
within the parties’ discretion whether to submit reasonable offers,
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there is no danger that a form of alternative dispute resolution will
be forced on the parties without their consent.1 The only
potentially significant indirect cost from settlement escrows is an
increase in the number of lawsuits filed solely to extract a settlement
offer. However, we do not think that this effect is likely to be large.
It thus appears feasible to establish an experiment with settlement
escrows in an actual litigation setting.
This article is structured as follows. Part I considers the reasons
why cases do not settle, or why they do not settle more quickly than
they do, and discusses how settlement escrows can facilitate settle-
ment in each context. Part II provides a game-theoretic model of a
settlement escrow in order to further demonstrate how this device
can reduce delay and promote settlement in the presence of asym-
metric information. In the model, the use of an escrow device results
in a higher level of settlement than would occur in the absence of
the escrow, and thus saves transactions costs for the parties. In addi-
tion, the expected settlement is as close or closer to the true value of
the claim than in the absence of a settlement escrow. Part III dis-
cusses some subtle issues and potential problems with the implemen-
tation of settlement escrows. Part IV briefly suggests some potential
applications of the model outside the context of civil litigation and
Part V addresses the relationships among arbitration, mediation, and
settlement escrows.
I. Sources of Delay and Impasse in Pretrial Bargaining
and the Role of Settlement Escrows
Litigation involves large costs from delayed settlement because of
resources devoted to discovery, attorneys’ fees, and the costs asso-
ciated with uncertainty. Although most cases settle before trial,
many do not settle early, and some do not settle at all. There is a
                                                                                                               
1For criticism of court-annexed arbitration and other alternative dispute
resolution procedures that may be forced on parties against their will, see L.
Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique
of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 2249 (1993); S. Shavell, Alternative Dispute
Resolution: An Economic Analysis, ___ Journal of Legal Studies ___ (1994).
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large literature in economics2 and psychology,3 and a less formal
proscriptive literature4 which documents and explains aspects of de-
lay in bargaining. In this section, we discuss five broad explanations
for delay and impasse in pre-trial bargaining: differences in informa-
tion between litigants, optimism, behavioral reasons, noninforma-
tion-based strategic reasons, and lawyer/client agency problems. The
model we develop in Part II formalizes only the asymmetric infor-
mation explanation, but we argue informally in this section that set-
tlement escrows can effectively counteract certain other causes of
delay documented below.
There are a number of reasons for impasse in pretrial bargaining
that we do not explore. Lawsuits may not settle because of one or
both party’s desire for his “day in court,” or third-party effects, such
as the effect on litigation by other parties against the defendant, or
the defendant’s interest in maintaining a reputation for toughness in
order to deter future litigation. It seems less likely that settlement
escrows will have an impact on settlement in these settings.
A. Asymmetric Information
We begin with information-based explanations. In much civil
litigation, litigants have private information which is useful for as-
sessing the outcome at trial. Consider a typical tort claim. The
plaintiff may have better information about the extent of damages
because the effect of the injury may be difficult for another party to
                                                                                                               
2For earlier studies applying game theory to settlement bargaining, see
L. Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information, 15 Rand
Journal of Economics 404 (1984); B. Nalebuff, Credible Pretrial Negotiation, 18
Rand Journal of Economics 198 (1987); J. Ordover and A. Rubinstein, O n
Bargaining, Settling, and Litigation: A Problem in Multistage Games with
Imperfect Information, New York University, C.V. Starr Center for Applied
Economics, Economic Research Report 83-07 (1983); I. P’ng, Strategic Behavior
in Suit, Settlement, and Trial, 14 Bell Journal of Economics 539 (1983); J.
Reinganum and L. Wilde, Settlement, Litigation and the Allocation of
Litigation Costs, 17 Rand Journal of Economics 557 (1986); K. Spier, The
Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation, 59 Review of Economic Studies 93 (1992).
3See, e.g., M. Neale and M. Bazerman, Cognition and Rationality in
Negotiation (1991); H. Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (1982).
4See, e.g., J. Freund, Smart Negotiating (1992); R. Fisher and W. Ury,
Getting to Yes (1981).
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observe. A defendant may have better information about liability be-
cause he knows his level of care.
Asymmetric information leads to costly delay in pretrial bargain-
ing because of the effect an offer has on the other party’s beliefs
about the offeror’s private information. Neither party may be willing
to make a reasonable offer in the early stages of pretrial litigation be-
cause such an offer will lead to the inference that the offeror’s case is
weak. The recipient will adjust his beliefs and reservation values ac-
cordingly. Alternatively, if the private information is about the costs
of a trial, the party making the first offer may communicate that he
is anxious to settle the case. Consistent with these effects, attorneys
report that they often resist being the first to propose a settlement
out of fear of signaling weakness in their case.5
Although many asymmetric information bargaining models lead
to delay, it is useful to point out why the common value nature of
litigation bargaining may lead to greater delay than other forms of
bargaining, thereby making settlement escrows especially attractive
in this setting. Litigation bargaining involves common values be-
cause private information about the outcome of litigation affects the
other party’s reservation price for settlement.6 In other words, the
plaintiff’s claim is an asset which both parties value similarly.7 If a
plaintiff reveals a willingness to settle for a small amount it reveals
that the lawsuit is not valuable for the plaintiff, which makes it less
valuable to the defendant to make the case go away. This is in con-
trast to private value bargaining, where the private information may,
for example, be a worker’s alternative wage. In this case, revealing
                                                                                                               
5See, e.g., Libel ADR, 10 Alternatives 51 (1992); W. Brazil, A Close
Look at Three Court-Sponsored ADR Programs: Why They Exist, How
They Operate, What They Deliver, and Whether they Threaten Important
Values, 1990 University of Chicago Legal Forum 303, 333-34.
6For a model of bargaining with common values, see D. Vincent,
Bargaining with Common Values, 48 Journal of Economic Theory 47 (1989).
Spier, supra note 2 analyzes a dynamic model of litigation bargaining with
common values.
7The values need not be exactly equal. Often they will not be equal be-
cause of private information about litigation costs, risk preferences, and other
relevant factors. So long as there is a common value element, so that one par-
ty’s reservation price will be affected by the other party’s private information,
our argument is valid.
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the private information does not affect the worker’s value to the
employer and therefore does not affect the employer’s reservation
value. In such a setting revealing information is unlikely to be as
damaging and delay less severe than in common value bargaining.8
The beneficial effects of settlement escrows can be derived in a
simple model such as the one we develop in section 2. In this section
we informally describe how and why the model works. Assume that
the plaintiff has private information about the outcome of litigation.
A plaintiff who knows that his case is weak will be willing to settle
for a relatively small amount. Suppose that there is an equilibrium
where a plaintiff with a weak case makes an early reasonable settle-
ment offer that the defendant accepts. If the defendant rejects the
offer, he can make a counteroffer which takes into account the in-
formation about the plaintiff’s case that the defendant infers from
the initial offer. In addition, if the plaintiff with a weak case deviates
by not making a reasonable offer, the defendant will infer that the
plaintiff’s case is strong, and may make a high offer in response.
These two effects combine to limit the plaintiff’s willingness to
make a reasonable offer and make it unlikely that there will be an
equilibrium with early settlement.
In contrast, consider what happens in a settlement escrow.
Again assume there is an equilibrium where a plaintiff with a weak
case submits a reasonable demand and the defendant submits an of-
fer that will settle with a weak plaintiff. If the defendant deviates
and does not submit such an offer, he does not learn that the
plaintiff has a weak case and cannot use this information to make a
low counteroffer. The defendant can only infer that the plaintiff
has a weak case if both parties submit offers which cross in the set-
tlement escrow. However, the defendant cannot now use this in-
                                                                                                               
8A second feature of litigation bargaining which can increase delay
relative to some other settings is that delay may not work as an effective signal
of private information. In a labor strike, private information may be about firm
profitability. It has been argued that it is more costly for a profitable employer
to endure a strike than an unprofitable one, since it is giving up more each day
the strike continues. Thus, an unprofitable employer may be able to signal this
through its willingness to endure a strike. In litigation, it is unclear how the
costs of delay vary with private information, so more difficult for delay to act as
a signal. In some cases, this can lead to longer delays for all parties.
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formation to his advantage because the case has already settled.
Thus, the secrecy of the settlement escrow reduces the ability of
parties to use the information revealed by reasonable offers, thereby
increasing the incentives of parties to make such offers. The result is
an increase in settlement or a reduction in delay.
There is a second related beneficial effect of settlement escrows.
We need to complicate the story to show how it works. Assume
that, in addition to the plaintiff having private information about
damages, the defendant has private information about the likelihood
of liability. The outcome of litigation depends on each side’s private
information. If there is settlement prior to litigation, it will be the
parties with private information that their cases are weak, i.e.,
plaintiffs with low damages and defendants with high probability of
liability. Assume that, in the absence of a settlement escrow, there is
an equilibrium where a low-damage plaintiff makes a settlement
demand that a high-liability defendant accepts. Not only does a
high-liability defendant infer that the plaintiff has low damages, so
does a low-liability defendant, for whom the offer was not intended
to lead to settlement. The adverse inference effect operates on the
low-liability defendant, allowing him to respond with a low offer.
Now consider the settlement escrow game. The low-liability
defendant does not expect to settle in the escrow and therefore
learns nothing about plaintiff’s information when there is no set-
tlement. This reduces the adverse inference from a reasonable offer
and may increase the likelihood of settlement relative to bargaining
in the absence of a settlement escrow. In section II.E we develop a
numerical example of a two-sided private information which illus-
trates this.
Although our model is extremely stylized, we believe the insights
extend to more complex and realistic models and are sufficiently
intuitive that it is reasonable to conclude that they are important in
actual litigation settings. The key argument is that settlement
escrows can mitigate the adverse inference effect, although they
cannot eliminate it. To see this, think about what happens if one
side, say the plaintiff, makes a reasonable offer into the settlement
escrow, while the defendant does not. Assume that the defendant
either makes no offer, or makes an offer so low that the defendant
does not expect to settle, independent of the size of the plaintiff’s
damages. Consider the inferences in the next stage. The defendant
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learns nothing about plaintiff, despite the fact that the plaintiff
demanded very little. Since the offers do not cross, the escrow agent
remains silent and does not reveal the offers. The defendant reasons,
“I made an offer which no plaintiff will accept, no matter how
strong or weak his case. Therefore, I cannot learn anything about
the strength of the plaintiff’s case from the fact that the plaintiff did
not make an offer which crossed mine.” Since the negative
inferences from making a reasonable offer are less likely to occur, the
parties are more willing to make reasonable offers.
The settlement escrow does not eliminate the negative inference
problem completely. In our model, the defendant who makes a
reasonable offer into the settlement escrow expects to settle via the
escrow with plaintiffs who submit low demands, i.e., those who
know that they are likely to do poorly at trial. When the agent fails
to report a settlement to the defendant, the defendant will reason in
the following way: “I made an offer which I expected would result
in settlement with low-damage plaintiffs. Since there is no settle-
ment, it must be that I am facing a high-damage plaintiff.” This
inference benefits a plaintiff in subsequent negotiations and reduces
the incentive to make a reasonable offer in the first place.
In other words, refusing to make a reasonable offer leads to
beneficial inferences with those who expect to settle via the escrow
but has no effect on those who do not expect to settle. Since it has
no effect on the beliefs of those who do not expect to settle, the
negative inference problem is reduced, and parties are more willing
to make reasonable offers into a settlement escrow than to make
reasonable offers directly to the opposing party. It is an empirical
question whether or not, in practice, settlement escrows can miti-
gate the negative inference problem sufficiently to result in signifi-
cant reductions in delay. A cost-benefit calculation makes settlement
escrows attractive, however, because, as we explain below, it is diffi-
cult to come up with an explanation of how settlement escrows can
reduce settlement. In addition, we will argue that the costs of im-
plementing a settlement escrow are very small. Thus, it seems
worthwhile to experiment to see if they indeed do reduce delay sig-
nificantly.
8 Chicago Working Paper in Law & Economics
Settlement escrows seemingly resemble the game analyzed by
Chatterjee and Samuelson9 and proved to be efficient by Myerson
and Satterthwaite.10 The result of the latter paper is that a single
chance to make sealed-bid offers where settlement occurs if and only
if the offers cross is an efficient mechanism in certain private value
bargaining settings.11 The result is fundamentally different from
ours. We are interested in the effects of adding a settlement escrow
to the existing bargaining game, not replacing the bargaining game
with a different mechanism. In our approach, there is neither
commitment to delay ordinary negotiations pending the outcome of
the escrow process, nor commitment to avoid further bargaining if
the parties fail to settle in the settlement escrow. We argue that in-
dependent of the bargaining game that exists, adding a settlement
escrow is likely to improve settlement and unlikely to have any sig-
nificant costs. Given that it is very difficult to imagine how to force
parties to commit to a particular bargaining mechanism, this dis-
tinction is essential for appreciating the normative implications of
the paper.
B. Optimism
A second leading explanation for why cases don’t settle, despite
the substantial costs that can be saved by settling, is that one or both
the parties is unduly optimistic about his chances in the litigation.12
                                                                                                               
9K. Chatterjee and W. Samuelson, Bargaining Under Incomplete
Information, 31 Operations Research 835 (1983).
10R. Myerson and M. Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral
Trading, 29 Journal of Economic Theory 265 (1983).
11Given that pretrial bargaining is probably best-modeled as a common
value game, the Myerson-Satterthwaite result does not apply. For mechanism
design approaches to pretrial bargaining, see K. Spier, Efficient Mechanisms
for Pretrial Bargaining, in Three Essays on Dispute Resolution and
Incomplete Contracts, Ph.D. dissertation, MIT (1989) and D. Spulber,
Contingent Damages and Settlement Bargaining, unpublished manuscript,
Northwestern University, (1990).
12See J. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 Journal of Legal
Studies 279 (1973); W. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14
Journal of Law and Economics 61 (1971); W. Landes, Sequential versus Unitary
Trials: An Economic Analysis, 22 Journal of Legal Studies 99 (1993); G .
Miller, Settlement of Litigation: A Critical Retrospective, unpublished
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The distinction between optimism and asymmetric information is
that if a litigant credibly reveals his opinion about the outcome of
litigation, this does not affect his rival’s belief about the outcome.
Let us say that initially the plaintiff expects that he will get
$200,000 at trial while the defendant expects that he will only have
to pay $150,000. Now let us say there is some way for the plaintiff to
convince the defendant of his belief. If the defendant still believes
that he will only have to pay $150,000, then there is a difference in
opinion, not a difference in information.
If each party’s opinion about the outcome of litigation is com-
mon knowledge, and symmetric information bargaining is efficient,
the parties will fail to settle out of court only if the plaintiff’s expec-
tation of trial outcome exceeds the defendant’s by the sum of each
party’s litigation costs. Thus, there is no settlement only if one or
both parties are sufficiently optimistic. If there is randomness in the
process by which parties assess a case, then this condition of excessive
optimism is always possible. It is these cases which fail to settle un-
der the optimism hypothesis.
There may be reasons to believe that parties tend toward un-
justifiable optimism aside from the pure statistical probability based
on the difficulties of appraising the value of a case. Lawyers may
have an incentive to overstate the value of a case to a client in order
to scuttle settlement and increase fees. In addition, recent research
has shown that, in simulated litigation settings, people tend to in-
terpret ambiguous information in a favorable light.13
In a model where there are differences of opinion, not differ-
ences in information, and each party’s opinion is known to the
other, settlement escrows do not facilitate settlement. In such a
                                                                                                               
manuscript, University of Chicago (1993); George Priest, Reexamining the
Selection Hypothesis, 14 Journal of Legal Studies 215 (1985); R. Posner, An
Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 Journal
of Legal Studies 399 (1973); G. Priest and B. Klein, The Selection of Disputes
for Litigation, 13 Journal of Legal Studies 1 (1984); M. Ramseyer and M.
Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in
Japan, 18 Journal of Legal Studies 263 (1989).
13L. Babcock, G. Loewenstein, S. Isaacharoff, and C. Camerer, Biased
Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, unpublished manuscript, Carnegie-
Mellon University (1992).
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model, all suits which can be settled are settled, so there is nothing a
settlement escrow can do.
However, it seems very unlikely that a litigant’s opinion will be
observable by an adversary.14 In a Bayesian setting, if one litigant’s
expectation about the outcome at trial has no impact on the other
litigant’s expectation, the different beliefs must derive from how
common information is processed or different prior beliefs. It is dif-
ficult to imagine how a party’s prior or idiosyncratic information
processing can be directly revealed to others.
Thus, if litigants have different opinions, it is likely that the
opinions themselves will be private information. In this case, the
optimism model is quite similar to the asymmetric information
model. Parties will try to signal that they are very optimistic as a way
to extract good settlements, just like parties try to signal private in-
formation that they have a strong case.15 The inference a defendant
draws when a plaintiff signals a belief that he has a strong case is
that the plaintiff will only settle for a large amount. This may lead
to a higher counteroffer from the defendant. In this environment,
settlement escrows can be an effective device for reducing delay. The
difference is that bargaining becomes a private value rather than a
common value game—one party’s information has no direct effect
on the other party’s valuations of settlement or trial. The costs of re-
vealing an opinion that your case is weak is not as large as revealing
information that your case is weak because the latter bolsters your ri-
val’s view of how he does at trial while the former does not. This
may reduce the value of a settlement escrow relative to the common
value setting that we model.
C. Behavioral Explanations for Delay
There is a large experimental literature on bargaining.16 In many
settings bargaining outcomes and strategies do not coincide with the
                                                                                                               
14In fact, in order for the bargaining to be efficient, the opinions
probably need to be common knowledge which is even more unlikely.
15See, e.g., R. Cooter and S. Marks with R. Mnookin, Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 Journal of
Legal Studies 225 (1982).
16M. Neale and M. Bazerman, supra note 6, surveys this literature
extensively.
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game-theoretic models underlying the experiments. In this section
we explore some of the findings from this literature which apply to
litigation bargaining, and discuss the effect a settlement escrow
might have in such settings.
One experimental result which is also echoed by practitioners is
that the first offer placed on the table may set the agenda for future
discussions.17 “[A]n initial offer can anchor subsequent moves by
both sides. The other side often anchors a negotiation by its early
demands. Once negotiators respond to these demands with sug-
gested adjustments, this act gives credibility to that anchor.”18 A
practitioner discussing the tradeoff between making the first offer or
not, states that the conventional wisdom is to let one’s opponent
make the first offer but sometimes he advises a client to make the
first offer because, “your bid sends a message to your counterpart: if
he wants to play ball, here’s the ballpark where the action will oc-
cur.”19
The secrecy of settlement escrow offers may help reduce delay if
neither party wants to make the first offer, or if the first offer is an
attempt to anchor further bargaining. A litigant willing to settle for
a reasonable amount may choose to avoid making a reasonable offer
for fear of anchoring the bargaining around a point which is unfa-
vorable to him. The only way an offer into the settlement escrow
can affect subsequent negotiations is through the learning which
occurs from the failure to settle in the escrow.
Reactive devaluation, which is “the tendency for disputants to
devalue each other’s concessions simply because it is the adversary
who offered the concession”20 can increase delays in bargaining. In
a common value asymmetric information bargaining environment,
such as the one describe in section A, it is rational for parties to de-
value concessions because they signal information about the value of
the suit. However, there are also psychological reasons why reactive
devaluation may occur.21 If a party does not interpret a concession
                                                                                                               
17See, H. Raiffa, supra note 6, at 128 and M. Neale and M. Bazerman,
supra note 6, at 48.
18M. Neale and M. Bazerman, supra note 6, at 50.
19James Freund, supra note 7, at 114.
20M. Neale and M. Bazerman, supra note 3, at 75.
21Id. at 75-77.
12 Chicago Working Paper in Law & Economics
by an adversary as a willingness to compromise, but merely a small
step towards reasonableness, the incentive to makes such a conces-
sion is diminished. The party making a concession cannot expect
reciprocation. This can lead to delays in reaching a settlement, but
should not have as great an impact in a settlement escrow. An
adversary only learns about a “concession” in the escrow if there is
agreement.
Some evidence that aggressive first offers are in the interest of
the parties is found in Herbert Kritzer’s study of negotiation and
bargaining in ordinary civil litigation.22 Kritzer found that high ini-
tial demands (relative to stakes) by plaintiffs and low initial offers
(relative to stakes) by defendants were correlated to success for the
relevant side.23 Kritzer measured the stakes of a case by asking the
attorney what an appropriate outcome would be from the client’s
viewpoint.24 Although these results are not unambiguous, it does
appear that more aggressive initial offers tended to correlate with
better success on the merits in Kritzer’s study. A settlement escrow
may facilitate settlement in this respect because the parties are free to
make aggressive offers outside of the escrow while making more re-
alistic offers within the escrow, with the knowledge that the offer
into the escrow will not be revealed to the other unless the offers
cross.
D. Other Strategic Reasons for Delay
In section A, we showed why a litigant may not wish to signal
private information because of its effect on subsequent bargaining.
In this section, we explore other strategic reasons why a litigant may
not wish to signal private information. In all the settings we discuss,
signaling a weak case through a reasonable offer induces an adversary
to change what he does in some way which hurts the offeror. The
effects described here are complementary to the arguments in sec-
tion A, so they are likely to exacerbate delay and inefficiencies pre-
dicted from the formal model alone.
                                                                                                               
22H. Kritzer, Let’s Make a Deal: Understanding the Negotiation
Process in Ordinary Litigation (1991).
23Id. at 54.
24Id. at 47. When that evaluation changed during a case, the highest
evaluation was used.
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A defendant may not make a reasonable offer because it may
increase the resources the plaintiff devotes to discovery. By signaling
a high likelihood of liability, the defendant suggests that the plain-
tiff should not give up in discovery until he has uncovered sufficient
evidence to make a strong case. Clearly, a defendant does not want
to send such a signal because compliance with discovery is costly.
Also, there is always some chance that the plaintiff will miss some-
thing important and the defendant does not want to minimize this
chance. The defendant may prefer to wait until after discovery to
make a reasonable offer, if he makes one at all.
More generally, signaling a weak case may induce the other party
to devote greater effort and more resources to the case. If a de-
fendant signals high damages, he may induce the plaintiff to hire a
private investigator, or a more expensive expert witness. The plain-
tiff’s lawyer may put a more skilled associate on the case, or devote
more attention to the case himself, rather than delegating the work
to associates. Of course, these effects will depend on how the incre-
mental value of these investments are affected by the information, so
they could go either way.
It is more difficult to tell a compelling story about the defen-
dant’s resources as a function of the plaintiff’s signal. Perhaps if a
plaintiff signals low damages, the defendant will devote more re-
sources to pursuing summary judgment, although the defendant
might also decide to devote fewer resource to the case since it poses
less of a threat to the defendant’s interests.
The most significant effect of this form may be the impact a
defendant’s signal of a weak case will have on the drop/continue
decision. Once the plaintiff and his attorney hear a reasonable offer,
they will either accept the offer or continue the case. There is no
longer any chance that the case will be dropped.
All of these strategic effects are additional reasons why a litigant
may not make an early reasonable offer and therefore additional
reasons why a settlement escrow may be in the mutual interest of
the parties.  
E. Lawyer/Client Agency Problems
Litigants rely on their lawyers to provide advice about pretrial
bargaining as well as all other aspects of legal proceedings. Since it is
impossible to observe everything a lawyer does and it is impossible to
14 Chicago Working Paper in Law & Economics
tell with certainty whether advice was correct ex post, it will typically
be impossible to write a contract with a lawyer which perfectly
aligns the lawyer’s incentives with the client’s wishes. In particular,
nonlawyer clients necessarily rely on their attorneys for an evaluation
of the value of the case;25 but the attorney if working on an hourly
fee will often have an incentive to overstate the strength of a case in
order to induce the client to bring the case in the first place, or to
continue the litigation rather than settling. If the client relies on the
attorney’s representation, delay and impasse will result. Although a
settlement escrow does not eliminate the incentive of an attorney to
misrepresent the case to his client, the client may realize that the
settlement escrow offers a special opportunity to settle and he may
not delegate the decision to his attorney.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys are often paid with a contingency fee. This
may give the attorney an incentive to settle rather than litigate since
the attorney bears the costs associated with proceeding to trial and
only gets a fraction of the benefits. However, the plaintiff may be
unwilling to settle early given that he does not bear the cost of his
attorney’s efforts. It is possible that the attorney can convince the
plaintiff that the settlement escrow provides a unique opportunity to
settle the case. The plaintiff may be more willing to go along. This
would tend to increase the frequency of settlement in contingency
fee cases, albeit at the expense of a somewhat lower recovery for the
plaintiff.
II. The Model
We now develop a formal model which shows how settlement
escrows facilitate early settlement. The specification of the model is
the simplest one we could solve which rigorously demonstrates the
practical benefits of settlement escrows.
Consistent with the extensive literature on pretrial bargaining,
we assume that the private information is nonverifiable, so there is
no way for a party to reveal its information directly; there are no
documents, affidavits, or physical evidence that can reveal the private
information. Despite its ubiquity in the literature, it is an assumption
                                                                                                               
25See G. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 Journal of
Legal Studies 189 (1987).
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that requires some further justification. If the private information
affects the outcome of a trial, and a trial is a basically a mapping
from evidence to an outcome, it must be possible to present the pri-
vate information as evidence at trial.
Why then can the parties not credibly reveal the information to
adversaries prior to trial? The are several potential answers. First, the
sanctions associated with perjury, falsifying or withholding evidence
may be sufficiently great to make credible claims which are not
credible in the absence of these sanctions.
Second, although it may be possible to reveal the information, it
may not be in an informed party’s interest to reveal it. In simple
models of verifiable information, this will not be the case. A well-
known inductive argument implies that because the party with the
most favorable information of those expected to be silent will reveal
it, there is complete unraveling and all information will be re-
vealed.26
However, this result will not hold if, for example, the defendant
is not sure whether the plaintiff is informed. In this case, silence
means either bad information or no information. Since it is impos-
sible to make a verifiable claim of ignorance, private information
may remain private. Also, if there is a chance that bad information
may not come out at trial or discovery, the informed party may prefer
to wait before revealing the information, hoping that the other side
will drop the case, make an attractive settlement offer, or fail the
find the damaging evidence through discovery. If any of these are
the case, then the asymmetric information model is appropriate.
Even if there is no voluntary exchange of information, there is a
great deal of information exchanged through discovery. It is not
unreasonable to assume that once discovery is completed, informa-
                                                                                                               
26The unraveling result is due to S. Grossman, The Informational Role
of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality, 24 Journal or Law
and Economics 461 (1981) and S. Grossman and O. Hart, Disclosure Laws and
Takeover Bids, 35 Journal of Finance 323 (1980). For applications to legal
settings, see S. Shavell, Sharing of Information Prior to Settlement or
Litigation, 20 Rand Journal of Economics 183 (1989); S. Shavell, Acquisition
and Disclosure of Information Prior to Economic Exchange, unpublished
manuscript, Harvard University Law School (1991); D. Baird, R. Gertner, and
R. Picker, Game Theory and the Law, forthcoming (1994).
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tion is pretty much symmetric. Thus, one would expect many cases
to settle prior to trial, but after discovery. This appears to be consis-
tent with the evidence. This neither means that settlement escrows
are not useful nor that the nonverifiable information model is inap-
propriate. We typically model trials as the institution which leads to
information revelation. A more appropriate model may be one
where discovery is the institution where private information is re-
vealed. If this is the preferred model, one can simply relabel the trial
stage of the model as the discovery stage. Then the implication of
the model is that settlement escrows move settlement from post-dis-
covery to pre-discovery.
A. Setup of the Model
The model’s structure is simple. There are two players: a plaintiff
and a defendant. The plaintiff has private information about
damages, denoted by X. The defendant believes that X is uniformly
distributed on [XL, XH]. We assume that each side knows that the
defendant will be found liable with certainty, so X is also the ex-
pected judgment.
The game without a settlement escrow proceeds as follows: in
the first period, the plaintiff can make a settlement demand to the
defendant. If the defendant rejects the demand, each side incurs liti-
gation costs of k1. The game proceeds to the second period where
the defendant can make a counteroffer. If the plaintiff rejects, each
party incurs litigation costs of k2 and litigation occurs. The game
ends after either an offer is accepted or litigation results in a final
judgment. The structure of the game and the defendant’s prior be-
liefs are common knowledge.
The game with a settlement escrow is identical except each party
can make a settlement offer to the escrow agent prior to any
bargaining; we simply tack the settlement escrow onto the begin-
ning of the game. We assume there are no costs incurred between
the settlement escrow and the first round offer.
This specification is as simple as possible to demonstrate the ef-
ficacy of settlement escrows. We need at least two stages of bargain-
ing in order for a reasonable first round offer to be rejected and fol-
lowed by a counteroffer which reflects the inferences from the first
offer. One-sided asymmetric information simplifies the analysis
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greatly. The cost of this simplification is that one of the benefits of
settlement escrows is lost. We rectify this by analyzing a numerical
example of a two-sided asymmetric information version of the
model in section E.
The basic solution concept we adopt is Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (pbe). A pbe is a set of actions and beliefs at every
decision point for a player. The actions must be optimal given the
beliefs and the beliefs must be consistent with Bayes’ Rule. Since
actions must be optimal at every information set, this equilibrium
concept imposes sequential rationality. In some cases, there are mul-
tiple equilibria in the final round of bargaining, so we need to use a
refinement of pbe. In these cases we adopt the Farrell, Grossman &
Perry (fgp) refinement.27 The qualitative results do not depend on
our choice of refinement. We focus on pure-strategy equilibria in
order to simplify the analysis.
B. Analysis of the Game without a Settlement Escrow
In the one-sided asymmetric information version of the model,
the analysis of the game is much simpler if k2 > k1. Therefore, we
proceed with this assumption. In section D, we have a brief discus-
sion of what happens when k1 £ k2. We begin by solving the last
period of the game. If there is settlement in the first period, it must
be the low damage plaintiffs who settle, i.e., there is some X1 such
that all types of plaintiffs with damages less than or equal to X1 set-
tle. The reason for this is that if it is in some type’s interest to settle,
it must also be in the interest of any plaintiffs with damages below
that type—they can only do worse in the continuation game.
Therefore, we only need to solve the second period game for all val-
ues of X1.
If the defendant offers Z2, the plaintiff will accept if his return is
greater than by rejecting and litigating, i.e., he will accept if Z2 ‡ X-
k2. Thus, all types of plaintiffs with damages less than X2 = Z2+k2 will
accept. Given the uniform distribution, the probability of acceptance
                                                                                                               
27J. Farrell, Communication in Games I: Mechanism Design Without
a Mediator, MIT Working paper (1983); S. Grossman and M. Perry, Perfect
Sequential Equilibrium, 39 Journal of Economic Theory 97 (1986).
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is (X2-X1)/(XH-X1). The plaintiff will choose Z2 to minimize his
expected litigation costs,
X2 − X1( )Z2 + XH − X2( ) k2 + 12 X2 + XH( )[ ]
XH − X1
 (1)
Substituting for X2 with Z2+k2 and differentiating, gives the
first-order condition
Z2 = X1+k2 (2)
which implies
X2 = X1+2k2 (3)
Substituting into (1), the expected cost to the defendant is
VD = 12 XH + X1( ) + k2 − 2k2
2
XH − X1
 (4)
This solution is interior if XH-X1 ‡ 2k2. If this is not the case,
the defendant offers XH-k2 and every type of plaintiff accepts.
We can now fold the analysis back into the first period where
the plaintiff can make an offer. Assume that there is an equilibrium
where the plaintiff offers Z1 if X £ X1 and makes no offer if X > X1.
There are three types of incentive constraints that must hold for this
to be an equilibrium: a plaintiff with damages X1 or less must prefer
offering Z1 to deviating; a plaintiff with damages greater than X1
must prefer making no offer to offering Z1; and the defendant must
prefer accepting the offer to rejecting it. The first two constraints
will be satisfied if a plaintiff with damages X1 is indifferent between
offering Z1 and making no offer.
In the analysis that follows, we must keep track of what the
defendant infers from an offer. In the proposed equilibrium, if the
defendant receives a demand of Z1, he will infer that the plaintiff
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has damages uniformly distributed on [XL, X1], and if he receives no
offer, the defendant will infer that the plaintiff has damages uni-
formly distributed on [X1, XH].
We need to consider three cases separately: (1) XL+2k2 < X1 < XH;
(2) X1 £ XL+2k2; and (3) X1 = XH.
Case 1: XL+2k2 < X1 < XH. A plaintiff with damages X1 must be
indifferent between demanding Z1 and making no demand and
waiting for an offer from the defendant. If the plaintiff demands
Z1, he receives Z1. If he does not demand Z1, the defendant will
infer that the plaintiff has damages between X1 and XH. The de-
fendant will respond with an offer of min{X1+k2, XH-k2}. When the
second argument is the minimum, it turns out that the equilibrium
that survives refinement is for all types of plaintiffs to settle in the
first, which shifts us to Case 3. Therefore, we focus here on the case
where the defendant responds with X1+k2. The deviating plaintiff
will also incur costs of k1, for a net return of X1+k2-k1. Thus, a
necessary condition for equilibrium is
Z1 = X1+k2-k1 (5)
Now we consider the defendant’s strategy. If he receives a de-
mand of Z1, he infers that the plaintiff is between XL and X1. If the
defendant accepts, he pays Z1. If he rejects, the counteroffer that
minimizes his expected payments is XL+k2. The defendant’s expected
cost in the final round is ½(XL+X1)+k2-2k22/(XL-X1). In addition he
will have to pay k1 in litigation costs. Therefore, the defendant will
accept the offer of Z1 if
Z1 ≤ k1 + 12 XL + X1( ) + k2 − 2k2
2
X1 − XL
 (6)
Simple algebraic manipulation shows that constraints (5) and (6)
are mutually inconsistent if k2 > k1, which we have assumed. Thus,
there can be no settlement in the first round where X1 > XL+2k2.
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Case 2: X1 £ XL+2k2. In this case, if the defendant rejects the
plaintiff’s offer, his counteroffer will be a corner solution. A neces-
sary condition for the plaintiff with damages X1 to make the de-
mand Z1 remains (5). If the defendant rejects the offer Z1, he will
counter with an offer of X1-k2 that any type of plaintiff who made
the original offer will accept. The cost to the defendant from reject-
ing is X1+k1-k2, so the defendant will accept only if
Z1 £ X1+k1-k2 (7)
Constraints (5) and (7) are mutually inconsistent if k2 > k1, so
there can be no settlement in the first round satisfying the condi-
tions of either Case 1 or Case 2. The only possible settlement in the
first round is complete settlement, i.e., we are in Case 3 and X1 = XH.
Case 3: X1 = XH: A necessary condition for there to be an equi-
librium where all types of plaintiffs settle is that the highest damage
plaintiff does as well by making the offer Z1 as he would if he liti-
gates. The latter strategy yields XH-k1-k2, so equilibrium requires
Z1 ‡ XH-k1-k2 (8)
If the defendant accepts, he pays Z1. If the defendant rejects, his
beliefs are the prior since all plaintiff types offer Z1. The defendant
will counter with an offer of XL+k2 and he expects to pay
k1+½(XL+XH)+k2-2k22/(XH-XL), so the incentive constraint is
Z1 ≤ k1 + 12 XL + XH( ) + k2 − 2k2
2
XH − XL
 (9)
Combining inequalities (8) and (9) yields
XH − XL ≤ 2 k1 + k2( ) + 2 k1 k1 + 2k2( ) (10)
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which is a necessary condition for equilibrium. In fact, it is also a
sufficient condition, because there is no way the defendant will ever
offer more than XH-k2 in the final round of bargaining, so a
plaintiff with damages XH will never get more than XH-k1-k2 by
deviating from a pooling offer. Thus, there is an equilibrium where
all types of plaintiff settle in the first round if (10) holds. This
condition indicates that early settlement occurs if uncertainty (XH-
XL) is small or if litigation costs are high. The plaintiff’s equilibrium
demand is
Z1 = k1 + 12 XL + XH( ) + k2 − 2k2
2
XH − XL
 (11)
We have now fully characterized the solution of the game
without a settlement escrow: If (10) does not hold, the equilibrium
of the game is for the plaintiff to make no demand in the first
period; the defendant offers Z2 = XL+k2 in the final round of
bargaining; if X £ XL+2k2, the plaintiff accepts, otherwise the parties
litigate. If (10) holds, in the first round of bargaining the plaintiff
demands ½(XL+XH)+k1+k2-2k22/(XH-XL) and the defendant accepts.
C. The Solution to the Game With a Settlement Escrow
In this section, we analyze the bargaining game with a settle-
ment escrow. The game is identical to the one without the settle-
ment escrow except a settlement escrow is attached at the beginning
of period 1. This captures the idea that the settlement escrow has no
effect on the form of bargaining outside of the escrow. In the set-
tlement escrow, each party submits a settlement offer to an officer of
the court. If the plaintiff’s demand is less than or equal to the de-
fendant’s offer, the court imposes settlement at the average of the
two offers. If the plaintiff’s demand exceeds the defendant’s offer,
the officer of the court announces only that there has been no set-
tlement; he does not reveal either party’s offer. Parties are free to
submit no offer, or equivalently the plaintiff can demand an astro-
nomical sum and the defendant can offer zero. The officer of the
court still only reports a failure to settle, so these strategies are
equivalent.
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Again we focus on pure-strategy equilibria. Assume that in
equilibrium the defendant submits an offer Z0 into the settlement
escrow. Given this, we can reduce the plaintiff’s strategy to a choice
between submitting Z0 or submitting nothing. If the plaintiff
submits an offer less than Z0, settlement occurs as often as if he
submits Z0, but the plaintiff receives less. Any offer greater than Z0
is equivalent to no offer. Thus, there are only two possible choices
for the plaintiff.
If some types of plaintiffs prefer submitting Z0 to making no
offer into the escrow, it will include the types with the lowest dam-
ages. Thus, if there is any settlement in the escrow, we can assume
that plaintiffs with damages from XL to some X0 settle via the es-
crow for Z0.
Again we need to split the analysis into separate cases. We must
distinguish between situations where there is no settlement in the
first post-escrow round of bargaining from situations where all types
settle in the first post-escrow round. If
X0 ≤ XH - 2 k1 + k2( ) − 2 k1 k1 + 2k2( )  (12)
we are in Case 1 and there is no settlement in the first post-escrow
round. If (12) does not hold and X0 < XH, we are in Case 2 and all
remaining types of plaintiff settle in the first post-escrow round.
Case 3 is where X0=XH.
We begin with Case 1. A plaintiff with damages X0 must be
indifferent between submitting Z0 into the settlement escrow and
making no offer. If he submits Z0, he receives Z0. If he makes no
offer into the settlement escrow, then the defendant, who has
submitted Z0, infers that Plaintiff’s damages are above X0. The
continuation game is equivalent to the game without a settlement
escrow except that the defendant believes damages are uniformly
distributed on [X0, XH] rather than [XL, XH]. Using our analysis of
the game without a settlement escrow, the plaintiff will not make
an offer in the first round and the defendant will offer X0+k2 in the
final round of bargaining which the plaintiff will accept if X
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£ X0+2k2. Thus, the return to X0 from submitting no offer is X0-
k1+k2. Indifference implies that
Z0 = X0-k1+k2 (13)
Equilibrium requires that the defendant does as well by submit-
ting Z0 as he does by making no offer.28 If the defendant submits
Z0, with probability (X0-XL)/(XH-XL), the plaintiff submits Z0, so
the defendant pays Z0; with probability (X0+2k2-X0)/(XH-XL ) =
2k2/(XH-XL), the plaintiff accepts the defendant’s final round offer
of X0+k2, so the defendant pays X0+k1+k2; and with probability (XH-
X0-2k2)/(XH-XL), litigation results, so the defendant expects to pay
k1+k2+ ½(X0+2k2+XH) = k1+2k2+ ½(X0+XH). Thus the defendant’s ex-
pected payments are
X0 − XL( ) X0 − k1 + k2( ) + 2k2 ( X0 + k1 + k2 ) + XH − X0 − 2k2( ) k1 + 2k2 + 12 X0 + XH( )[ ]
XH − XL
(14)
If the defendant deviates and does not submit an offer into the
settlement escrow, the officer of the court will announce that there
was no settlement. Since the plaintiff’s offer remains secret, the
defendant does not learn whether or not the plaintiff submitted Z0.
The defendant cannot subsequently take advantage of a low-damage
plaintiff’s willingness to settle because he does not learn that the
plaintiff submitted Z0. The defendant cannot treat a plaintiff who
submitted an offer into the escrow differently from one who did
not. This is the key distinguishing feature of a settlement escrow in
the model.
The equilibrium of the continuation game if the defendant de-
viates turns out to be equivalent to the game without a settlement
escrow. Although this may seem obvious, we must be careful because
the continuation game is not identical to the game without a set-
                                                                                                               
28The defendant always prefers submitting Z0 to any amount greater
than Z0, and any offer less than Z0 is equivalent to no offer.
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tlement escrow. The reason for this is that the plaintiff’s knowledge
about the defendant’s beliefs may be different from what they are in
the game without a settlement escrow. In the game without a set-
tlement escrow the plaintiff knows that the defendant believes that
damages are uniformly distributed on [XL, XH]. In the settlement
escrow game, if the defendant does not submit an offer in the es-
crow, a plaintiff with damages greater than X0 did not expect to set-
tle in the escrow. When no settlement occurs such a plaintiff mis-
takenly believes that the defendant played his equilibrium strategy.
Therefore this plaintiff thinks that the defendant believes that dam-
ages are distributed uniformly on [X0, XH]. In fact, since the defen-
dant did not submit an offer, he learns nothing about the plaintiff’s
type and actually believes that damages are distributed uniformly on
[XL, XH]. In contrast a plaintiff with damages between XL and X0
expected to settle in the escrow; when this does not occur, the
plaintiff learns that the defendant deviated and that defendant
learned nothing, so plaintiff knows that defendant must believe that
damages are distributed uniformly on [XL, XH].
Despite the complicated belief structure that results from a de-
viation by the defendant in the settlement escrow, it is easy to solve
the continuation game. In the first round, a plaintiff with damages
above X0 believes that there has been no deviation and therefore
continues to play his equilibrium strategy and does not make a set-
tlement offer. A plaintiff with damages between XL and X0 is
participating in a game where the defendant believes that damages
are uniformly distributed on [XL, XH] and the plaintiff knows these
are the defendant’s beliefs. Thus, the exact same argument we used
to show that there is no equilibrium with settlement in the first
round of the game without a settlement escrow implies that there is
no settlement here.29 Thus, in the final round of bargaining, the
defendant believes that damages are distributed uniformly on [XL,
XH]. Following the analysis of the game without a settlement
escrow, the optimal offer is XL+k2 which the plaintiff accepts if X
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there can be no settlement in the first round of post-escrow bargaining.
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£ XL+2k2. The expected payments by the defendant if he deviates in
the settlement escrow are therefore
2k2 k1 + XL + k2( ) + XH − XL − 2k2( ) k1 + 2k2 + 12 XL + XH( )[ ]
XH − XL
(15)
The defendant’s incentive constraint is that (14) is less than (15)
which simplifies to
(X0-XL)(X0-XL-4k1) £ 0. (16)
Thus, there can be an equilibrium with settlement in the escrow
if X0 £ XL+4k1.
In fact, there are many equilibria in the settlement escrow game.
This should be no surprise given the simultaneity of the offers into
the settlement. For example, if the defendant does not submit an
offer into the escrow, the plaintiff can get no benefit from
submitting an offer. Therefore not submitting an offer is a best-re-
sponse for each party if the other party does not submit an offer.
Similarly there can be an equilibrium where X0 is anywhere between
XL and XL+4k1 so long as the condition for Case 1, given by (12), also
holds.
We now consider Case 2, defined by (12) not holding and X0 <
XH. We show there cannot be any settlement in the escrow in this
case. If (12) does not hold, then the continuation equilibrium is for
the plaintiff to offer
Z1 = k1 + 12 X0 + XH( ) + k2 − 2k2
2
XH − X0
 (17)
independent of damages and the defendant will accept. A plaintiff
with damages X0 will be indifferent between submitting Z0 and
deviating only if Z0 equals Z1 as given by (17).
If the defendant submits Z0, then this is his expected payment.
If he deviates by not submitting anything into the settlement es-
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crow, rejecting all first period offers, and making a counteroffer of
XL+k2, his expected payments are
k1 + 12 XL + XH( ) + k2 − 2k2
2
XH − XL
 (18)
which is less than Z0 since X0 > XL .
Case 3 where X0 = XH can occur under the same conditions
where the equilibrium in the game without the settlement escrow
leads to all types settling in the first round. In the settlement escrow
game, the settlement can either occur in the escrow or in the first
post-escrow round. Since no costs are incurred between the escrow
and the first post-escrow round, there is no economic difference
between the two.
This allows us to complete the characterization of equilibria in
the game with a settlement escrow. If (10) holds then all types settle
prior to incurring any litigation costs. The settlement can either be
through the escrow or Plaintiff’s offer. Let us denote
K ≡ 2 k1 + k2( ) + 2 k1 k1 + 2k2( ) . (19)
If XH-XL ‡  K+4k1 then there are equilibria in the settlement es-
crow with X0 anywhere between XL and XL+4k1. If K £  XH-XL <
K+4k1, then there are equilibria in the settlement escrow with X0
anywhere between XL  and XH-K and if XH-XL < K all parties settle
prior to incurring any litigation costs.
D. Comparing the Two Regimes
In this section we compare the equilibria between the models
with and without settlement escrows. Introduction of a settlement
escrow into the model reduces litigation costs or, at worst, has no
effect. If the game without an escrow leads to all types settling
without litigation costs, the same outcome occurs with the settle-
ment escrow. If, on the other hand, all types do not settle in the
game without a settlement escrow, the equilibrium without the set-
tlement escrow results in no settlement in the first round and a
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probability 2k2/(XH-XL) of settlement in the final round. Every
equilibrium of the game with the settlement escrow leads to no set-
tlement in the first post-escrow round and a probability 2k2/(XH-XL)
of settlement in the final round. Thus, any positive probability of
settlement in the escrow reduces litigation costs.
The savings can be substantial. They are 8k1(k1+k2)/(XH-XL) in
the equilibrium which maximizes settlement in the escrow. To
make this more concrete, we look at a numerical example. Let XL =
500, XH = 1500, k1 = 80, k2 = 100. The equilibrium of the game
without the settlement escrow is for the defendant to offer 600 in
the final round, which is accepted with probability 0.2. Each side
incurs expected litigation costs of 80+.8(100)=160. In the game with
a settlement escrow, the equilibrium with the least litigation is for
the defendant and plaintiffs with damages below 820 to submit 840
into the settlement escrow. In the final round of bargaining, the
defendant offers 920 if he did not settle in the escrow. The offer is
accepted by plaintiff if damages are less than 1020. Each side incurs
expected litigation costs of .32(0)+.2(80)+.48(180)=102.4 for a 36
percent savings in litigation costs over the game without a
settlement escrow.
The reason why settlement escrows increases early settlement
can be seen by comparing defendant’s strategy across models. Note
that the plaintiff’s incentive constraint in the first period of the
game without a settlement escrow, given by (5), is the same as his
incentive constraint in the escrow, given by (13). In either case, the
plaintiff either gets Z1 (Z0 in settlement escrow game) or waits for
the optimal counteroffer of X1+2k2 (X0+2k2) in the final round after
incurring litigation costs of k1. However, the defendant’s decision
differs dramatically across the two regimes. In the first period of bar-
gaining in the game without a settlement escrow, if the defendant
rejects the plaintiff’s offer, he knows plaintiff has low damages and
can respond with a low counteroffer that plaintiff will accept. With
k1 < k2, any offer that is sufficiently low that the defendant will ac-
cept it, the plaintiff is unwilling to make. In contrast, in the settle-
ment escrow, if the defendant rejects the plaintiff’s offer by not
submitting Z0 into the escrow, he does not learn that plaintiff has
low damages and therefore cannot make different offers to a low-
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damage and high-damage plaintiff. The settlement escrow limits
the negative inferences that result from a reasonable offer, thereby
making a low-damage plaintiff more willing to make an offer which
leads to early settlement.
If k1 ‡ k2, then there is some settlement in the first round of
bargaining in the game without a settlement escrow. Introduction
of a settlement escrow creates significant complications because the
equilibrium necessarily involves mixed strategies off the equilibrium
path. There can be equilibria with settlement in the escrow, but the
benefits are typically smaller than if k1 < k2. The equilibrium has the
same basic features as in the model we have analyzed: if there is set-
tlement in the escrow, the continuation equilibrium looks just like
the game without the settlement escrow, only with X0 replacing XL
as the minimum of the distribution of damages. If there is no set-
tlement via the escrow in equilibrium, there are no benefits from
introducing the settlement escrow, but there are no costs either.
It is worth pointing out that settlement escrows are not effective
because they add an extra round of bargaining into an artificially
constrained model. In fact, if the settlement escrow replaced the
first round of bargaining, it would be even more effective. Since
there are no costs incurred between the escrow and the first post-
escrow round, it adds nothing to the ability of parties to signal or
screen.
A necessary condition for wanting to adopt settlement escrows is
that they reduce expected litigation cost. However, this is not suf-
ficient. It is also important to compare the expected outcomes for
each type. A regime which simply increases settlement will not be
attractive if the settlement amounts do not reflect the underlying
merits of the case. For example, a legal rule which says that the
plaintiff always loses can do wonders for promoting settlement, but
is obviously a very bad rule. The settlement escrow generally leads to
expected payoffs that are more in line with the underlying merits of
the case than are the outcomes without the settlement escrow. A
settlement escrow increases settlement, the terms of which depend
on the expected outcome in litigation, the size of litigation costs,
and the bargaining power in pretrial negotiations. By saving litiga-
tion costs, expected payments typically move closer to the underlying
expected outcome in litigation.
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Table 1 contains a comparison of outcomes across three different
scenarios: the game without a settlement escrow, the game with a
settlement escrow where the equilibrium is X0 = XL+2k1, and the
game with a settlement escrow where the equilibrium is X0 =
XL+2k1. We focus on these two equilibria because the first is the one
which leads to the greatest reduction in litigation costs and is the
equilibrium that the plaintiff likes best, while the second equilibrium
is the one that the defendant likes best.
We compare the expected payments by the defendant, the re-
covery by the plaintiff averaged over all damage types and the average
over all plaintiff types of the absolute value of the plaintiff’s net
recovery and what he should receive, X. This last measure prevents
us from liking a regime which gives the plaintiff X ≡ 12 XL + XH( )
on average but which is not sensitive to the plaintiff’s actual damages
X.
The table indicates that the plaintiff does better with the
settlement escrow and his net recovery is closer to X . The
defendant does equally well with the settlement escrow if X0 =
XL+4k1 and better if X0 = XL +2k1. In the latter case, his payments are
also closer to X . Finally, we see that the average absolute deviation
from X is the same in the game without the settlement escrow and
settlement escrow equilibrium with X0 = XL+4k1 and it is lower if X0
= XL+2k1. The settlement escrow game always does weakly better in
this statistic than the game without a settlement escrow. Thus, we
see that the settlement escrow not only lowers litigation costs, but
also leads to outcomes that are typically closer to the underlying
merits.
F. A Numerical Example with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information
We now assume that the defendant also has private information
about the outcome of litigation. Specifically, he has better informa-
tion about the likelihood of liability. The reason for analyzing a
two-sided private information version of the model is that it allows
us to introduce and analyze an additional benefit of settlement es-
crows. In the one-sided private information model, the settlement
escrow increases the likelihood of settlement because it permits the
plaintiff to make a reasonable offer which the defendant does not
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learn about unless it settles the case in the escrow. In the two-sided
private information case, a low-damage plaintiff may wish to make
an offer that only a high-liability defendant will accept. In the game
without a settlement offer, a plaintiff who makes such an offer must
realize that he not only reveals information to the high-liability de-
fendant, for whom the offer is intended, but also all other types of
defendants. These types of defendants can now bargain knowing
that the plaintiff has low damages. Furthermore, if the plaintiff does
not make the equilibrium offer, all types of defendant will believe
that the plaintiff does not have low damages. This makes it very un-
likely that there will be early settlement absent a settlement escrow.
By contrast, in a settlement escrow, low-liability defendants do
not make a reasonable offer into the escrow, and they therefore will
not learn anything about the plaintiff. A low-damage plaintiff will
have less incentive to avoid making a reasonable demand designed
for a high-liability defendant because he can make it without reveal-
ing low damages to the low-liability defendants.
Because the game gets very complicated when we introduce
two-sided asymmetric information, we will focus on a numerical ex-
ample. The structure of the model is identical to the one-sided case
with one addition: the defendant can be one of three types: wL, wM,
wH, where the defendant’s type is the probability that he will be
found liable. Thus, if a defendant with liability w litigates against a
plaintiff with damages X, the expected award is wX. The defendant
knows the realization of w, while the plaintiff believes that each of
the three possibilities is equally likely. The structure of the bargain-
ing games are the same as before: the plaintiff makes a demand; if it
is rejected, litigation costs of k1 are incurred by both sides; then the
defendant makes a counteroffer; if it is rejected, there is litigation
and both sides incur litigation costs of k2. Again, we focus on pure-
strategy equilibria.
Let XH = 1500, XL = 500, wH = 1, wM = 0.9, wL = 0.7, k1 = 80, and k2
= 60. The plaintiff’s prior is that each type is equally likely. We begin
with the game without a settlement escrow. It is easy to show that
there can be no settlement in the first round of bargaining. In order
to do this, we must solve the game in the final round. We assume
that the defendant believes that damages are distributed uniformly
on [X1, 1500], and that these beliefs are common knowledge. In a
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separating equilibrium, the defendant wH will make the offer that
minimizes his litigation costs given that the offer reveals his type.
This offer is wHX1+k2. A defendant with liability wM will make the
highest offer that it can which defendant wH does not want to
mimic. The plaintiff is indifferent between accepting and rejecting
an offer of Z2M, given that the plaintiff believes the offer is from
defendant wM if damages are X2M = wMZ2M-k2. The values of X2M
and Z2M which make defendant wH indifferent between playing his
equilibrium strategy and mimicking defendant wM are given by
X2M = [1200+9X1-(288000+2400X1+X12)½ ]/8
Z2M = 3[2000+27X1-(288000+2400X1+X12)½ ]/80.
The formulas for X2L  and Z2L are quite complicated, so we omit
them.
For some parameter values there will also be a pooling or a partial
pooling equilibrium where two or more types of defendants make
the same offer. However, we chose parameter values such that this
does not occur, thereby eliminating the need to make difficult
refinement arguments.
 Assume that in the first period a plaintiff with damages be-
tween XL and X1 makes an offer Z1 that defendant wH accepts in
equilibrium. The plaintiff X1 must be indifferent between offering
Z1 and not making such an offer. Plaintiff X1 must do at least as
well with defendants wM and wL  by not making the offer. If plain-
tiff X1 does not make the offer, defendant wH will respond with an
offer of X1+60. Incorporating first period litigation costs, plaintiff X1
receives X1-20. Thus, a necessary condition is Z1 ‡ X1-20. If de-
fendant wH accepts the offer he pays Z1; if he rejects the offer,
plaintiff X1 believes that the defendant is either wM or wL.
Therefore, plaintiff X1 will accept a counteroffer of .9X1-60 next
period, for a total cost of .9X1+20. Thus, a necessary condition for
defendant wH to accept Z1 is Z1 £ .9X1+20. The two necessary
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conditions are inconsistent if X1 > 400, which must be the case since
XL = 500.
This illustrates an important difference between the one-sided
and two-sided asymmetric information case. In the latter setting, if
the plaintiff makes an offer that is designed for a high-liability de-
fendant, the defendant has the option to reject the offer, use the
information that the plaintiff has low damages and make the plain-
tiff believe that the defendant is not the high-liability type. This last
italicized effect is not present in the one-sided asymmetric informa-
tion model and makes it even more difficult for there to be settle-
ment in the first round.
The equilibrium in the game without the settlement escrow has
no settlement in the first round. In the second round, defendant wH
offers 560 which the plaintiff accepts if X is between 500 and 620,
defendant wM offers 432.94 which the plaintiff accepts if X is be-
tween 500 and 547.71, and defendant wL  offers 305.34 which the
plaintiff accepts if X is between 500 and 521.91.
We now show that there are equilibria in the settlement escrow
game where parties settle via the escrow. In particular there is an
equilibrium where defendant wH submits 730 into the settlement as
does the plaintiff if his damages are between 500 and 750. There is
no settlement in the first round of bargaining after the settlement
escrow. In the final round of bargaining defendant wH offers 810
which the plaintiff accepts if X is between 750 and 870, defendant
wM offers 510 which the plaintiff accepts if X is between 500 and
633.33, and defendant wL offers 316.6 which the plaintiff accepts if
X is between 500 and 538.
The plaintiff with damages 750 is indifferent between submit-
ting 730 into the settlement escrow and waiting for 810 in the sec-
ond round after incurring litigation costs of 80. Note that the
plaintiff’s decision with respect to the settlement escrow has no ef-
fect on what happens with defendant’s of type wM and wL. Since
they do not submit an offer into the settlement escrow they will not
be able to infer anything about the plaintiff’s type. If defendant wH
plays his equilibrium strategy, his expected payments are .25(730) +
.12(80+810) + .63(140+1185) = 1124.05. If he deviates by not submitting
730 into the escrow, the best he can do is mimic defendant wM
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which leads to expected payments of .1333(80+510) +
.8667(140+1066.67) = 1124.44. This is greater than the 1124.05 that
defendant wH pays in equilibrium. Defendant wM prefers his
equilibrium strategy to mimicking defendant wH. The latter yields
expected payment of .25(730) + .75(140+1012.5) = 1046.88 which is
more than .1333(80+510) + .8667(140+960) = 1032 which defendant
wM expects to pay in equilibrium. Note an benefit of the settlement
escrow is that it relaxes the incentive constraint of defendant wH not
wishing to mimic defendant wM in the final round. This increases
the probability that defendants wM and wL  settle.
The final thing to check is that there will be no settlement in
the first round of bargaining after the settlement escrow has oc-
curred. By the same argument made for the game without the set-
tlement escrow, settlement in the first round is difficult since the
plaintiff who does not make a demand is thought to have higher
damages thereby getting a high counteroffer and the defendant has
the option to reject thereby being thought of as a lower liability type.
However, there is one slight complication. Consider a plaintiff with
damages slightly greater than 750 who did not submit an offer into
the escrow. If he makes a demand that is designed for defendant
wH, the defendant can reject and be thought of as a lower liability
type. However, it does not immediately follow that there is much to
be gained by defendant wH if defendant wM prefers to make an offer
that attracts the low damage plaintiffs that would have already set-
tled with wH in the escrow. Nonetheless, one can show that there is
an equilibrium that satisfies our refinement where there is no set-
tlement in the first post-escrow round.
This example has demonstrated that the negative inferences
associated with reasonable offers is greater when there is two-sided
asymmetric information than when there is only one-sided asym-
metric information. This makes early settlement especially difficult.
A settlement escrow mitigates, but does not eliminate the negative
inference problem, by preventing a party who does not submit a
reasonable offer into the escrow from learning about the other par-
ty’s offer. This reduces the costs of making reasonable offers and
increases the likelihood of settlement.
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III. Some Implementation Issues
In this section we explore some of the complications associated
with implementing a settlement escrow regime.
A. Timing and Revisions of Escrow Offers
From a theoretical viewpoint, the most interesting implemen-
tation issue may be how often offers into the settlement escrow can
be revised. If the litigants do not learn new information in the pre-
trial stages, the answer is easy. There should be a single opportunity
to make escrow offers and if the offers do not cross, there is no op-
portunity to try again.30 One way to think about this is to assume,
to the contrary, that there is an opportunity for each side to revise its
offer, should there be no settlement in the first escrow. Now, the
incentives to make a reasonable offer in the first settlement escrow
are much weaker. A litigant may reason that it can make an aggres-
sive offer in the first escrow, in the hopes that it may be settle any-
way, and only make a reasonable offer in the second round. This
implies that it is unlikely that there can be an equilibrium where
there is significant settlement in the first escrow game. Although
the negative inference problem is weaker, the same forces which
lead to little settlement in the early stages of ordinary pretrial bar-
gaining may also lead to little settlement in the early settlement es-
crow.
Nonetheless, a benefit to multiple settlement escrows can arise if
information is revealed through pretrial proceedings. Information
transfer will occur in discovery as parties learn about their adversaries’
private information through depositions and private documents. It
may be valuable to allow parties who fail at an initial settlement es-
crow to try again after discovery. The cost of allowing the second
settlement escrow is that it reduces the likelihood that the parties
will settle in the first settlement escrow.
There is no way to establish the optimal number or timing of
settlement escrows theoretically. It depends on the degree of asym-
metric information, the costs of different stages of pretrial litigation,
                                                                                                               
30This is somewhat analogous to the value of a commitment to not
renegotiate a contract or to have a second round auction after an initial auction
fails to generate a high price.
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and the amount of learning which takes place at these various stages.
An obvious point is that settlement escrow points should be set prior
to stages which involve large costs and they should be separated by
periods of information acquisition. Natural points would be shortly
after filing of the case, just prior to discovery, and just prior to the
trial.
B. Form of Offers
Many negotiated settlements involve more than just a transfer of
money in exchange for dropping a lawsuit. Examples include
agreements to not share information with third parties, alteration of
future practices, public admission of liability, or future corrective ac-
tion.31 If settlement escrows are restricted to a simple monetary
transaction, they may fail to promote settlement, simply because the
efficient agreement would include other clauses.
There are a number of factors that mitigate this problem. First,
many cases present pure issues of damages. The problem of form of
offers does not arise in such settings. Second, one might get the es-
crow agent, perhaps after consultation with the parties to choose the
form of a settlement agreement which can include supplemental
clauses. The offers will then be for settlement including these addi-
tional conditions, with the price adjusted accordingly. Another simi-
lar approach would be for there to be a menu of settlement agree-
ments, each with different subsidiary conditions. The parties could
then make offers for each of the possible forms of settlement agree-
ment. They could rank the different agreements as well. The agent
would then choose the highest ranking agreement in which the
offers cross.
Another mitigating factor is that the parties could always nego-
tiate the non-monetary clauses separately. In the absence of transac-
tions costs, asymmetric information over the value of the clauses
themselves, wealth effects, and differences in enforcement costs
between contractual and court-mandated agreements, the Coase
Theorem implies that the parties should just adjust the cash settle-
                                                                                                               
31Nonetheless, Kritzer, supra note 22, at 22, 43 demonstrates that in a
large percentage of ordinary civil litigation, the stakes are monetary. Settlement
negotiations usually involve only monetary terms (87% of tort claims and 58%
of civil rights/discrimination cases).
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ment to account for the different assignment of property rights as-
sociated with additional clauses. They will then contract for the ef-
ficient clauses. We suspect that these negotiations would have
significant transactions costs, but the point that the parties may be
able to negotiate the addenda to the basic agreement separately may
nonetheless have some importance.
Another potential complication for settlement escrows is the
presence of more than two litigants. Although we have not thought
through the details carefully, there is no reason why a settlement
escrow cannot be extended to include multiple defendants or plain-
tiffs. One needs to think carefully about sharing rules and whether
or not partial settlements are allowed. Free-rider problems will un-
doubtedly be present, but they will be part of any other pretrial bar-
gaining as well.
C. Legal Barriers
There would appear to be few, if any, legal obstacles to the im-
plementation of a settlement escrow by private agreement.
Arbitration agreements are strongly favored in federal courts,32 and
states generally follow the same policy.33 Although a settlement es-
crow may not fall within the technical definition of an arbitration,
since the escrow agent is nothing more than a ministerial figure
who stands ready to receive and review settlement offers, the nature
and purposes of settlement escrows are sufficiently close to tradi-
tional arbitration as to make it all but inconceivable that a private
settlement escrow would not be respected in court. If judicial con-
                                                                                                               
32See,. e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S.Ct. 1647
(1991)(upholding arbitrability under private agreement of disputes under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, despite inequality of bargaining
power between the parties and strong federal policy to protect older workers).
The policy favoring arbitration is commonly grounded in the Federal
Arbitration Act, see Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
33See L. Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected
ADR: A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2249, 2271 (1993).
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firmation of a private settlement escrow agreement is required, that
should be readily forthcoming as well.34
As we will discuss below, however, it may well be desirable for
the settlement escrow to be previously established under court aus-
pices, in order to prevent the adverse inferences that one party may
draw from the suggestion of the other party that the two agree to
establish a settlement escrow by private contract.35 There would not
appear to be significant problems with the establishment by a court
of a settlement escrow under court auspices. The authority of federal
district courts to institute such a program appears beyond question.
Such a program would undoubtedly fall within the inherent power
of the federal district courts to manage their own dockets36 and to
craft local rules governing litigation before particular courts.37 If any
doubt remained on this score, it should be dissipated by the over-
whelming support which Congress has expressed toward enhanced
use of alternative dispute resolution.38
The plaintiff’s offer into the settlement escrow could be con-
structed to include a conditional request to dismiss the claim with
prejudice, where the condition are crossing offers and payment of
the average of the offers to the plaintiff. This eliminates any possi-
bility that the parties will not be bound by their offers.
                                                                                                               
34See L. Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected
ADR: A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2249, 2273 (1993).
35See text accompanying note 39, infra.
36See, e.g., Lockhart v. Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44, 47 (E.D. Ky. 1987).
(“exigencies of modern dockets demand the adoption of novel and imaginative
means [such as] . . . compulsory arbitration, summary jury trials, imposing
reasonable limits on trial time, or, as here, the relatively innocuous device of
requiring a settlement conference [to be] attended by the clients as well as the
attorneys.”)
37See, e.g., White v. New Hampshire Department of Employment
Security, 455 U.S. 445, 454 (1982).
38See, e.g., Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub L. No. 101-650, 104
Stat. 5089 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. III 1991)
(directing each federal district court to consider the possibility of utilizing
court-annexed alternative dispute resolution programs).
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D. Voluntary or Mandatory Implementation
We now address the question of whether settlement escrows
should be court-initiated or whether parties should voluntarily opt in
or out of a settlement escrow. This will help us answer the follow-
ing related question: if settlement escrows are so good, why don’t we
see them already in contractual agreements? It is important to re-
member that a mandatory settlement escrow is not coercive in any
way; if the parties are required to submit offers at all (and they need
not be), the plaintiff is free to ask for an astronomical settlement
and the defendant is free to offer nothing.
One reason for mandatory settlement escrows is that the nego-
tiations between parties over whether or not to use a settlement es-
crow, may themselves signal information. The result may be ineffi-
cient underuse of settlement escrows. Settlement escrows are likely
to be most valuable to parties who have relatively weak cases because,
as the model demonstrates, they are more likely to settle through the
escrow. If a party suggests a settlement escrow, his adversary may
infer that the offeror’s case is weak. Therefore, often, neither party
will suggest a settlement escrow, despite the fact that each would be
better off if the settlement escrow was forced upon them.
This adverse selection problem clearly exists if the parties do not
have an opportunity to negotiate their dispute resolution procedures
prior to learning relevant private information. In the traditional tort
context, where there is no ex ante contracting and parties may ob-
tain their private information at the time of the tort, the signaling
aspect of voluntary settlement escrows may be severe and court-
mandated escrows may be justified.
In settings where parties contract before any relevant private
information is known, it is difficult to see why, if settlement escrows
are efficient, the parties do not contract for them. We will offer
three possible explanations, none of which is completely convincing.
First, bringing up dispute resolution procedures when negotiating a
contract may be a signal, not of the value of the ultimate claim, but
of the likelihood that a claim will arise through breach of contract.39
Second, lawyers negotiate and draft contracts and it may not be in
                                                                                                               
39The failure to sign pre-nuptial agreements is an example of this type
of argument. See K. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signaling, 23 Rand
Journal of Economics, (1992) for a formal model of these issues.
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their interest to propose efficient dispute resolution procedures, if
they stand to gain from expensive ones. Of course, this relies on the
ignorance of the contracting parties. Third, the parties may not
know about or understand the advantages of settlement escrows.
We conclude that given the large potential gains and small like-
lihood of harm from settlement escrows, coupled with the potential
advantages of court-supplied settlement escrows, that they should be
instituted by the courts. Escrows could be established as a default
rule, so that if parties wish to not give themselves the option of a
settlement escrow as part of a contractual agreement on dispute
resolution, they should be free to do so.
IV. Applications Beyond Litigation
We have focused on the use of settlement escrows in litigation.
There is no reason that they cannot also be useful in other forms of
disputes. Settlement escrows are likely to be especially valuable in
civil litigation because of the common value component of the bar-
gaining, the prevalence of disputes which can be resolved with a
purely monetary transfer, and, in the case of tort litigation, the in-
ability of the parties to contract for their own dispute resolution pro-
cedure prior to obtaining private information.
Labor disputes may be ill-suited for settlement escrows, given the
complex, multidimensional format of collective bargaining contracts.
A settlement escrow might be useful once the bargaining comes
down to one or two remaining points of disagreement.
Perhaps a better application outside of litigation would be in
bargaining over the purchase and sale of property. In many in-
stances, the parties need to agree on little other than a price. Despite
their potential value, we may not see settlement escrows in this
context for the same reason we won’t see in the tort setting: it may
be difficult for parties to contract prior to realization of private in-
formation. In particular, once a potential buyer finds out about the
property, he may have already realized his private information and
the adverse selection will be present.
V. Relation to Arbitration and Mediation
Settlement escrows have some features in common but also
differ in important ways from other existing alternative dispute reso-
40 Chicago Working Paper in Law & Economics
lution mechanisms. Binding arbitration is a substitute for the trial
and perhaps other parts of the litigation process. Litigation is a
structured process by which disputants gather information and pre-
sent their cases to an impartial decision-maker. The idea behind
most binding arbitration procedures is to replace the existing rules of
this process with more efficient ones.
By contrast, a settlement escrow is not a substitute for the stan-
dard litigation process, but a supplement to it. Although there is a
binding element to a settlement escrow, either party has the ability
to opt out of the process by making offers which will not lead to
settlement or by making no offers at all. Perhaps the easiest way to
see the very different nature of settlement escrows and binding arbi-
tration is to note that one could include settlement escrows as a part
of a binding arbitration regime.
Mediation and nonbinding arbitration are much closer in spirit
to settlement escrows but there are important differences as well.
The traditional role of nonbinding arbitration is to facilitate settle-
ment by giving the parties an unbiased view of the quality of their
respective cases. Settlement escrows are not motivated by giving a
party better information about the case. In some ways, the opposite
is true. The benefit of settlement escrows derive from their ability to
shield information transfer.
Mediation is also a nonbinding process. The traditional view is
that mediation is a process which facilitates settlement by assisting
in the creation and implementation of a bargaining process which
reduces conflict and helps the parties determine the form settlement
should take.40 Nonetheless, there are elements of mediation that we
believe can be interpreted as attempts to achieve similar benefits as
settlement escrows. One of the ways that mediators operate is to
shuttle back and forth between disputants who are not
communicating directly. The mediator elicits information from the
parties and provides some of the information to the other side. He
acts as a filter of the information, not necessarily reporting exactly
what the parties said, but some subset or his interpretation of what
                                                                                                               
40For a detailed study of mediator behavior, see D. Kolb, The Mediators
(1983). J. Brown and I. Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 Virginia
Law Review 323 (1994) analyze how mediators may add value by revealing
information to disputants that is communicated to them selectively.
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the parties meant. It is conceivable that this procedure may make
parties more willing to reveal private information to the mediator,
knowing that the mediator will not report it all to the other side,
thereby potentially avoiding some of the negative inference problem.
A complete argument would have to include why the disputants
report honestly and what the mediator’s incentives are. As far as we
know, this has not been done. Nonetheless, in an abstract sense, the
process may be analogous to settlement escrows.
Conclusion
Our conclusion from this analysis is that settlement escrows may
provide an inexpensive way to facilitate early dispute settlement. A
more certain conclusion could be reached by extending our research
to experiments in a laboratory designed to verify that the potential
gains from settlement escrows exist in simulated litigation settings
with realistic parameters. This paper has focused on the benefits and
some of the implementation problems associated with settlement
escrows. In addition to reducing litigation costs, settlement escrows
lead to settlements which tend to emulate the expected outcome in
litigation. Furthermore, we have argued that the direct costs of
implementing settlement escrows are very small.
There are two possible types of indirect costs from settlement
escrows. First, by promoting settlement, it is possible that more
lawsuits will be filed and, in particular, the incidence of lawsuits
which are filed solely to extract a positive settlement may increase. It
is far from clear, however, that settlement escrows will significantly
increase the return from filing a frivolous lawsuit. The most likely
effect from a large increase in the number of frivolous suits is that
defendants will not make offers in a settlement escrow which occurs
shortly after the lawsuit is filed. This in turn will eliminate the in-
cremental return from filing the frivolous suit. The equilibrium in
such a game may nonetheless involve some increase in frivolous
lawsuits if there is a way for a plaintiff with a frivolous suit to some-
times pool with legitimate plaintiffs in a settlement escrow. The
best way to deal with this may be to make sure that there is the op-
portunity to employ a settlement escrow at a stage in the pretrial
process where the plaintiff would necessarily have incurred signifi-
cant costs.
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It is also possible that settlement escrows may reduce the prob-
lem of frivolous suits. They may allow a defendant to settle a
frivolous suit more cheaply; an offer to a plaintiff with a frivolous
suit in the early stages of standard bargaining may signal high litiga-
tion costs, allowing the plaintiff to extract more. A settlement es-
crow may reduce this problem.
The second possible indirect cost is the possibility that the op-
tion to participate in a settlement escrow changes the subsequent
bargaining process in a way which reduces settlement by so much
that it overcomes the benefits from settlement in the escrow.
Although there are games where giving parties an option which
they can turn down may reduce welfare, this does not occur in our
model. We cannot think of any argument of how this can occur in
settlement escrows, more generally. Overall, we find neither of these
potential costs to be significant enough to overcome the potential
benefits from experimenting with settlement escrows in litigation.
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